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ABSTRACT 
 
The Crisis, Policy Reactions and Attitudes to 
Globalization and Jobs 
 
We consider the effects of the financial crisis and subsequent recession on world labour 
markets. It begins by cataloguing the adverse effects on output of the sudden collapse in 
demand brought about by the financial crisis in what has come to be called the Great 
Recession. Next we look at the labour market and how employment and unemployment have 
been impacted and document the very different responses by country.  We then move on to 
look at attitudinal indicators of the impact of the rising levels of joblessness we observe 
across most OECD countries. We examine data on well-being and on attitudes to 
employment. We also examine a number of questions about the impact of globalization that 
respondents across many European countries were asked in the Spring of 2010. Finally, we 
examine the policy responses of governments, and consider what lessons might be learned 
from the marked differences in labour market outcomes following the recession. 
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1.  The Great Recession. 
The origins of the financial crisis lay with the excessive expansion of credit by financial 
institutions in some countries in the 1990s and early part of this century. Due to the 
growth of complex financial derivatives and the global extension of capital markets, it 
became difficult for governments, regulators, and the banks themselves to measure the 
underlying risks associated with their loan books. Fears that some institutions were 
holding large amounts of bad debt led to a collapse in the supply of credit as financial 
institutions tried to rebuild their balance sheets. To remain solvent, some had to be 
recapitalized by their governments, so jeopardizing the public finances.  
 
The financial crisis led to a rapid contraction of demand. Firms could not obtain the credit 
required for normal trading.  Almunia et al. (2009) and Eichengreen and O’Rourke 
(2009) compare the severity of the Great Recession with the Great Depression of 1929. 
They argue that trade flows fell faster in the Great Recession than they did during the 
Great Depression.  The declines in trade across countries were also more synchronized. 
By the end of 2008, more than 90% of OECD countries had experienced a decline in 
trade exceeding 10%.  Not surprisingly, with largely coincident trade cycles, variations in 
output during the recession were also largely synchronized.  Araujo and Martins (2009) 
term this the "Great Synchronization" and argue that it is an outcome of globalization.  
Gordon Brown (2010) argues that this is the ‘first crisis of globalization’. 
 
These events are captured in Figures 1, 2 and 3.  Figure 1 shows percentage changes in 
private short-trade finance in OECD countries from 2005 to 2009. Beginning in 2008, 
there was a rapid retreat in the supply of private trade finance. In the absence of private 
trade credit, governments played a key role in supporting trade through Export Credit 
Agencies.  Figure 2 shows the impact of the recession on trade volumes in major trading 
blocs. World trade declined rapidly through 2008 and early 2009 before recovering 
strongly from 2009 Q3 onward. Figure 2 shows clearly that the trade cycles of the major 
groups of economies shared broadly the same turning points. Although the timing has 
been common, the extent of the recovery has varied substantially.  In contrast to the 
Asian economies, European trade was still significantly below its pre-recession level in 
late 2010.   
 
While the slump in trade affected demand, output in countries such as the United States, 
Spain, the UK and Ireland was also adversely affected by instability in property markets. 
This had a negative effect on the construction industry in these countries.  Countries with 
large financial sectors were also affected badly e.g. Iceland, Ireland, the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 
 
For most advanced countries, the decline in output was substantial. The combined output 
of OECD countries fell by 3.2% in 2009 and at the end of 2010 was still projected to be 
below its 2007 level. But the experience of less-developed countries has been markedly 
different.  While advanced economies were in recession, output in the emerging and 
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developing economies experienced only a temporary slowdown in growth.  In 2009 their 
combined output increased by 2.5% and is projected to have grown by 7.1% in 2010.  
Though the recession had a significant impact on the world's advanced economies, its 
impact on developing countries was much less pronounced.  
 
Figure 3 shows how GDP varied from 2005 in some major country groupings.  Again, 
while the magnitude of change differs across these groups, the timings are very similar, 
with the nadir of the recession being reached in late 2009.  Consistent with the trade data, 
the recovery in GDP has been weakest in Europe, and strong in the newly industrialized 
economies of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe.  Declines in output were particularly 
marked in industries with high exposure to international trade - notably manufactured 
goods.  Many of these countries also recovered quickly when trading conditions returned 
to normal.  
 
The fall in output by country is detailed in Table 1.  Using OECD data, it shows how far 
output fell from 2008 Q1 to the low point of the recession and how much it recovered by 
2010 Q3. The countries covered are OECD members and others that are monitored by the 
OECD. Countries are ordered by growth between 2008 Q1 and 2010 Q3.  Those 
countries which show a zero in the first column experienced no drop in output and 
therefore no recession. With the exceptions of Poland and Australia, all of these were 
developing countries. We also separately show growth rates for China for 2008, 2009 and 
2010.  Its overall growth in this period exceeds 30%, implying that it experienced only a 
mild slowdown. India follows some way behind at 15.6%.  
 
In contrast, output did fall in most OECD countries.  Thus, at the other end of the 
spectrum, 2010 output levels in Iceland, Ireland, Hungary and Greece were substantially 
lower than at the beginning of 2008.  Confirming the data in Figure 3, relatively few 
European countries had recovered to 2008 levels of output by 2010 Q3. 
 
2. The Labour Market 
The Great Recession was notable for the diversity of its impacts on labour markets in 
different parts of the globe.  While there may have been a Great Synchronisation in the 
timing of the trade cycle, labour market responses were notable for their diversity in both 
timing and scale.  The ILO estimates that the world unemployment in 2010 stood at 205 
million, equivalent to a global unemployment rate of 6.2% and 27.6 million higher than 
in 2007.  OECD estimates suggest that between 2008 Q1 and 2010 Q3 unemployment in 
the European Union rose by 5.6 million and in the United States by 6.6 million.  During 
this recession, the performance of the labour market in the developed world has been 
weaker than in developing countries.  Though there has been some recovery in output in 
the developed world, any associated increase in employment has been limited.  Thus far, 
the recovery has been "jobless".  
 
Table 2 sets out recent information on employment, unemployment and the labour force 
for OECD countries.  The numbers largely relate to changes between 2008 Q1 (which we 
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take as the staring point of the recession) and 2010 Q3.  Most OECD countries outside 
Europe, with the exception of the United States, experienced some employment growth 
since 2008.  In Europe, the picture is less optimistic.  For example, in Ireland and Spain, 
countries both affected by a construction "bubble", employment fell by 13.3% and 9.1% 
respectively. In the United States, a very large drop in employment was matched by an 
almost identical increase in unemployment.  But in the United Kingdom, unemployment 
rose by more than twice the fall in employment, whereas in Japan the increase in 
unemployment was only around half of the decline in employment.  Changes in 
employment were not necessarily good predictors of changes in unemployment. 
 
Those who are unable to find a job may remain unemployed or leave the labour market 
temporarily or permanently.  In previous recessions, workers have left the labour market 
in large numbers. The "discouraged worker" effect attenuates increases in unemployment.  
What is unusual about the current recession is that the workforce has declined in only a 
relatively small number of countries.  This contrasts with, for example, the experience of 
the 1980s when, in countries like the UK, there was a substantial rise in inactivity 
associated with increased unemployment. 
 
In the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Scandinavia, the size of the workforce 
increased over the course of the recession, albeit by relatively small amounts, which is 
more suggestive of an “encouraged worker” effect.  In countries where the recession has 
had less impact, such as Turkey and Poland, the growth in the workforce has been 
substantial.  This pattern may be reversed if the “jobless” recovery continues, leading to a 
significant growth in long-term unemployment which may cause workers to drift away 
from the labour market.  
 
The labour force in Ireland fell by 4.2% over the period, the largest decline in any OECD 
country.  One of the key drivers of this decline has been migration. In the year to April 
2009, net emigration from Ireland was 65,000. Most of the outflow comprised returning 
emigrants from Eastern Europe.  The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, 
forecast that net emigration from Ireland between 2010 and 2012 will average 2% of the 
population per annum (Barrett et al. 2010) with an increasing proportion being Irish 
nationals.  
 
Worker mobility has been an important equilibrating mechanism for the US labour 
market.  But there has been a significant reduction in US worker mobility in the Great 
Recession.  Frey (2009) shows that in 2007-2008, migration rates within the US reached 
their lowest post-war level. The fall was particularly sharp for long-distance moves.  
Ferreira et al. (2008) argue that negative home equity and high interest rates have a 
negative effect on residential mobility.  Though worker mobility may help to equilibrate 
the labour market in some jurisdictions, past experience may not necessarily be a good 
guide to future migration patterns.  
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Employers in different countries have responded in a variety of ways to a fall in product 
demand.  This will depend on the nature of employment contracts, human capital 
investment, the existing policy environment and any changes introduced specifically to 
combat the recession.  Employees’ response also depends on the nature of their contracts, 
joint investment in human capital and on their valuation of the next best alternative to 
employment. 
 
Elsby et al. (2009) argue that employment fell very rapidly in the US due to an 
unexpected surge in productivity.  This is not consistent with the traditional view that 
productivity is pro-cyclical.  Bauer and Schenk (2009) argue that in eight of the last nine 
downturns, US productivity fell during downturns due to labour hoarding behavior by 
firms.  Reich (2010) suggests that a possible explanation of the very rapid decline in 
employment is that the willingness of US employers to hoard labour has fallen.  During 
the downturn, employers were shedding workers more rapidly than reducing their output, 
leading to short-term productivity gains.  At the same time, investment was falling, 
limiting the potential for further productivity growth.  
 
Farber (2007) argues that tenure in private sector jobs in the US has been falling: fewer 
workers hold jobs for ten years or more; in 2006, one-fifth of jobs involved tenures of 
less than a year.  If length of tenure is an indicator of firm-specific human capital 
investment, then one might anticipate a more rapid increase in layoffs and discharges 
during downturns.  The reductions in tenure may signal some fundamental changes in the 
skill content of work, perhaps relating to the role of information technology (Autor, Levy 
and Murnane 2003).  Tenure reductions may also be a reflection of firms’ increasing 
efforts to reduce “slack” (Love and Nohria, 2005). 
 
Most developed countries experienced a less dramatic decline in employment than the 
US.  One possible explanation is the greater use of the intensive (hours) rather than the 
extensive (jobs) dimension of labour market adjustment.  Bell and Blanchflower (2011) 
argue that in the UK, hour adjustments played an important role in moderating 
employment reductions.  Between January 2008 and September 2010, employment in the 
UK fell by 1.4 per cent, but aggregate hours fell by 3.2 per cent (Source: Office of 
National Statistics).  Part of this change arises from changes in the average hours worked 
by full-timers.  It also partly stems from an increase in the numbers working part-time as 
opposed to full-time.  Part-time contracts tend to be less stable than full-time contracts. 
Working fewer hours may also affect eligibility for unemployment benefits.  
 
In those countries that have experienced a substantial inflow to unemployment and low 
rates of outflow into employment, unemployment durations have substantially increased.  
The US has experienced a particularly rapid rise in long-term unemployment.  In 
December 2007, those who had been unemployed for 15 weeks or more comprised 18 per 
cent of US unemployment.  By December 2010, this share had risen to 44 per cent.   
Figure 5 illustrates the rapid rise in long-term unemployment in the US to a post-war 
high. 
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Have increasing rates of long-term unemployment resulted from decreasing rates of 
outflow from unemployment?  Elsby et al (2009) argue that recent unemployment inflow 
rates are typical of past recessions.  Overall job separation rates changed little during the 
recession, but layoffs, that are more likely to become unemployed than those who quit, 
accounted for an increased proportion of these separations and therefore the initial rise in 
unemployment.  However, they argue that a decline in the outflow rate is the main 
explanation of the rapid rise in US long-term unemployment. Potential causes of the 
increasing dislocation of the long-term unemployed from the labour market include 
human capital depreciation and duration-contingent hiring practices on the part of 
employers. 
  
Another key feature of the Great Recession has been how its effects have been distributed 
across different groups within the population.  In previous work (Bell and Blanchflower 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c), we have shown that the young, the poorly educated and ethnic 
minorities have borne a disproportionate share of the increase in unemployment during 
the Great Recession in developed countries.  Table 2, which is drawn from harmonized 
unemployment rates estimated by Eurostat, illustrates the differences in youth 
unemployment across a variety of European Union other countries.  European countries 
that experienced financial crises associated with property bubbles, such as the Baltic 
Republics, Slovakia, Spain and Ireland have particularly high youth unemployment rates.  
 
Unemployment rates for those whose education did not go beyond lower secondary 
school (column 3) tend to be significantly higher than the average and reach a maximum 
of 63.5% in Slovakia.  In most countries there is greater excess supply of labour among 
the poorly educated although there are some exceptions.  Greece is an example where the 
unemployment rates of recent graduates are above average for their age group. 
 
Column 4 shows the ratio of youth to adult unemployment rates in 2010 Q3. There is a 
wide variation across countries signaling differing levels of integration of youth within 
the overall labour market.  Germany stands out as a clear exception with youth 
unemployment rates only 34% above adult rates.  This contrasts with countries such as 
Sweden, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom where the youth to adult unemployment 
ratio exceeds 3.  The variation in the youth adult unemployment ratio is not correlated 
with variation in overall unemployment rates and must reflect national differences in 
education and employment policies and practices.  
 
In Mediterranean countries, an important behavioral response to increased youth 
unemployment rates is for children to stay longer with their parents.  This may lessen the 
impact of being unemployed (Card and Lemieux, 2000, Chiuri and Del Boca 2008). 
Dolado (2010) argues that in Spain the family is the central pillar of the welfare system.  
Parents and children may have an implicit contract whereby parents provide extended 
support for their children in return for future care and support when the parents age.  This 
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behavior may partly explain the muted political response to historically high levels of 
youth unemployment in countries such as Spain and Italy. 
 
There is now widespread acceptance that youth unemployment is a particularly acute 
economic policy issue in developed countries. We wish to draw attention to the two 
further issues that have been less extensively discussed.  First, we have argued (Bell and 
Blanchflower 2010a) that current high levels of youth unemployment are partly a 
consequence of demography - the result of currently relatively large youth cohorts.  This 
argument has some validity for European countries, but it does not hold to the same 
extent for other parts of the world.  
 
Figures from the United Nations Population Database shows that Europe has the lowest 
share of its population aged under 25 and this share will change little over the next 
decade. Asia and South America have relatively high proportions of young people but 
their share in the overall population is expected to decline by 2020.  In contrast, Africa 
has more than 60% of its population, aged below 25 and although this share will decline 
slightly, the absolute number of those aged less than 25 in Africa is projected to increase 
by 17% between 2010 and 2020.  Africa does not have the extensive education and 
welfare support that is available in the developed world.  Unless effective policies are put 
in place to increase employment among the young, there is a danger of increased political 
instability as has recently been evidenced in Tunisia and Egypt. 
 
Second, youth unemployment data only partly capture the difficulties that young people 
are facing in the labour market. Our previous work (Bell and Blanchflower 2011) has 
indicated that young people are more likely to be hours constrained.  We used evidence 
from the UK Labour Force Survey, which asks employees whether they would wish to 
work more, less or the same number of hours.  There is a clear contrast in responses by 
age. Older workers would prefer to work fewer hours, whereas the young express a 
strong desire to work more hours. In this sense, many of the young people who are 
employed are contracted to provide fewer hours than they would wish: they are under-
employed. 
 
We now establish a further result, which illustrates another aspect of the difficulties that 
young people face in the recession.  We focus on job matches and whether the young 
have been disproportionately recruited into lower skilled jobs during the recession.  This 
adds to recent literature on the harmful effects of entering the jobs market during a 
recession.  Kahn (2010) shows that the labour market consequences of graduating from 
college during a recession have large, negative and persistent effects on wages.  Lifetime 
earnings are substantially lower than they would have been if the graduate had entered 
the labour market in good times.  However, we particularly focus on her finding that 
cohorts who graduate in worse national economies tend to end up in lower-level 
occupations.  
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Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) suggest that the period of early adulthood (between 18 
and 25) seems to be the age range during which people are more sensitive to 
macroeconomic conditions.  They find that being exposed to a recession before age 17 or 
after age 25 has no impact on beliefs about life chances.  However, youngsters growing 
up during recessions tend to believe that success in life depends more on luck than on 
effort; they support more government redistribution, but have less confidence in public 
institutions.  Recessions seem to adversely effect youngsters’ beliefs.  
 
Specifically, we investigate whether job matches by skill change during a recession, 
particularly for the young. In particular, we model whether the young accept jobs that 
require lower skill levels during a recession. We use quarterly data from the UK Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) for the period from 2005 Q1 to 2010 Q2, a time period which 
encompasses the Great Recession. The LFS occupational classification (SOC 2000) 
divides employment into four main skill groups - level IV (corporate managers and 
professionals), level III (associative professionals and skilled workers), level II 
administrative and service occupations), level I (elementary trades and service 
occupations).   We use this four-way classification of skill as the dependent variable in an 
ordered logit model, which includes individual characteristics as controls as well as time 
dummies, which capture whether the skill level of matches, conditional on individual 
characteristics, is changing through time.  Skill levels are numbered from one (least 
skilled) to four (most skilled). A positive coefficient on a variable therefore implies that it 
is associated with higher levels of skill. 
 
We divide the sample by age group, 16-24, 25-49 and 50+ and use gender, qualifications, 
region and ethnicity as controls.  Quarterly time dummies are included to determine 
whether, conditional on their characteristics, individuals find a job match at a higher or 
lower skill level during a period of recession.  Our results in Table 4 show that the young 
were more prone than other age groups to accept lower skilled jobs during the Great 
Recession.  Education, ethnicity and gender are also important influences on the skill 
level associated with job matches.  As might be expected, more education, being white 
and male are each associated with higher skilled occupations.   But our main result is that 
the trend in the time dummies since 2008 has been negative for all age groups, indicating 
that workers were accepting lower skilled jobs in 2010 than in 2005, conditional on their 
characteristics.  Figure 5 shows this result by plotting the full set of time dummies from 
2005 to 2010.  A downward trend occurs for all age groups, implying that workers of all 
ages are accepting lower skilled jobs than they might have previously when the labour 
market was stronger, but effect is strongest for those aged 16 to 24. If the state of the 
labour market causes better qualified applicants to accept lower skilled jobs, there are two 
important consequences. First, the difficulties of unqualified job applicants increases 
since they find themselves in direct competition with the better qualified. Second, 
following Kahn’s argument, if young people accept a lower skilled job initially, there 
may be long-lasting negative effects on their labour market experience.  
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Combined with our previous work, this result leads us to the conclusion that the Great 
Recession has particularly affected the young through: a) higher unemployment rates, b) 
higher levels of underemployment c) increased willingness to accept lower-quality jobs. 
In our previous work, we have discussed the issue of the "scarring" effects of youth 
unemployment.  Scarring means that adverse labour market experiences when young lead 
to further negative market outcomes well into the future.  The evidence for such scarring 
relies largely on cohort studies where youth unemployment is used to identify those at 
risk of later adverse labour market outcomes.  Unemployment has invariably been the 
marker to identify scarring.  As far as we are aware no research has been conducted on 
whether underemployment or sub-optimal job matches also lead to long-run scarring 
effects.   
 
3. Happiness and Attitudes to Employment and Globalization 
In this section we examine how attitudes have changed during the financial crisis.  It is 
rather early in the crisis to determine the impact of the recession.  One way is to see how 
individual’s attitudes have changed and how that varies across countries.  To do so we 
make use of micro-data at the level of the individual across the EU27 plus Croatia, 
Iceland, Macedonia and Turkish Cyprus.  These data are taken from two Eurobarometer 
Surveys conducted for the European Commission, #68.1 from September-October 2007 
and #73.4 conducted in May 2010.   
 
Comparable questions are available in both surveys on life satisfaction, employment and 
expectations for jobs over the following twelve months.  In 2010 a special component 
was also included on the crisis itself and individuals reported on whether they thought the 
crisis was over and whether they favored public intervention to create jobs.  Finally, we 
examine evidence on individual's views on the impact of globalization, on a number of 
outcomes including growth, inequality, prices plus its impact on citizens compared to 
large corporations.   
 
What we find is that happiness and well-being has held up reasonably well to this point, 
but has dipped sharply in several countries including Greece.  We further find evidence 
that the unemployed are especially unhappy and that shows no sign of improving.  Over 
time the unemployed are becoming less optimistic about the employment situation in 
their country.  They are especially likely to report that they expect the crisis to worsen, 
and unsurprisingly want the government to create jobs. 
 
In Table 5 we report the results of estimating a life satisfaction or happiness equation for 
both 2007 and 2010 (see Blanchflower and Oswald, (2004, 2011)).  The responses are 
ordered and are coded 1-4 as described in the notes to the table.  The appropriate 
estimation procedure here is ordered logit but for ease of exposition we make use of 
Ordinary Least Squares.  Fortunately results are broadly similar whichever procedure is 
used.   
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Happiness levels in Portugal, Spain and especially Greece have fallen sharply as well as 
in Latvia and Lithuania that have also seen big increases in unemployment.  This is true 
both in the mean scores reported at the end of Table 5 and in the regressions.  It is 
perhaps surprising to see that happiness in Ireland has held up reasonably well, but this 
may well be because the Irish, have seen dramatic income growth, from membership of 
the euro.  Indeed, in 2010 Ireland ranks 4th in the world according to the UN's human 
development index.  One puzzle is the jump in the happiness levels in the UK, which was 
2.91 in 2007 and 3.32 in 2010. It does seem however that this growth in happiness is 
unlikely to be sustained.  The date of the 2010 survey was in May, exactly at the time of 
the General election when a new coalition government was formed.  Since that time 
business and consumer confidence has collapsed, as have house prices, with the 
implementation of an austerity budget that cut public spending and raised taxes.   
 
The results in Table 5 are standard in that happiness is U-shaped in age (Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 2008); rises with the level of education; and is higher among right-wingers 
than left-wingers.  Unemployment lowers happiness.  The French, the Italians, the Greeks 
and the Portuguese and particularly the East Europeans are unhappy and the 
Scandinavians are the happiest.  Comparing the first two columns a number of findings 
stand out. 
 
1.  The unemployed have lower levels of happiness compared to the employed in 2010 
than they did in 2007. 
2.  Happiness levels of non-natives have fallen over time. 
3.  There was a big drop in the happiness levels of the least educated. 
4. Based on the change in the coefficients, there is a noticeable decline in the happiness 
levels in Greece (-.28), Ireland (-.14), Portugal (-.17) and Spain (-.10), which have been 
hard hit by recession and the sovereign debt crisis.   
  
In columns 3 and 4 we model individual's views on the 'employment situation’, which has 
clearly deteriorated over this period.   Of particular note here is that residents of Austria, 
the Netherlands and West Germany had seen a relative improvement in their position.  In 
both periods the Irish are especially gloomy about the job situation.  
 
In columns 1 and 2 Table 6 now looks at individual's views about what they expect to 
happen to employment over the next twelve months in 2007 and 2010.  It should be noted 
that young people are especially optimistic as are right-wingers and those with more 
education.  By 2010 the unemployed are becoming significantly less optimistic than the 
employed.  Expectations were much lower, measured by a change in the country 
rankings, in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  It is notable how the Swedes have 
jumped up the rankings, where despite the big drop in output, employment has risen.  
Residents in the UK were also more optimistic in 2010 than in 2007 and jumped up the 
rankings. 
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Column 3 estimates the probability of reporting that the worst of the jobs crisis is yet to 
come, which is estimated as a dprobit in STATA.  Men, the optimistic young, right-
wingers and the most educated are less likely to agree.  The unemployed are more 
pessimistic.  The Danes and the Swedes believe it is all over bar the shouting.  The 
Greeks, the Irish and especially the Portuguese believe the crisis still has legs. 
 
In column 4 we model whether the individual believes that it is the job of the public 
sector to create jobs in the midst of a financial crisis.  Unsurprisingly, the unemployed, 
the young, the least educated and left-wingers hold this view most strongly.  Residents of 
the corporatist countries of Denmark, Finland and Sweden along with the Irish hold this 
view.  Interestingly, residents of the UK hold this view even though their government is 
about to embark on a strategy of firing large numbers of public sector workers. 
 
The globalization of markets clearly played some part in the transmission of the 
recession.  Has this experience turned the citizens in advanced economies against 
globalization?  We provide some new evidence from Europe to provide at least a partial 
answer to this question.  Using data from the Eurobarometer Survey #73.4 for May 2010, 
we investigate how representative samples of citizens from EU countries responded to 4 
questions on globalization in 2010.  The questions asked citizens for their views about 
whether globalization (a) increased growth, (b) increased social inequality, (c) reduced 
inflation and (d) only benefited large companies and not citizens.  
 
Table 7 reports the percentage of respondents who agree or totally agree for each of the 
four attitude to globalization measures.  Support for the proposition that globalization 
improves growth is highest in Denmark (91%), the Netherlands (84%) and Sweden 
(87%) but is especially low in Greece (43%), Portugal (56%) and France (52%).  The 
vast majority of respondents believe globalization increases inequality and raises 
company profits, but do not believe it increases prices 
 
We use ordered logit models to identify how well individual characteristics predict 
attitudes to globalization. Our results are shown in Table 8 where we explore directly 
individual's views on the benefits of globalization in a special feature in the 2010 survey.  
It should be noted that no definition of the term globalization was given.  The questions 
related to the effects on growth, inequality, prices and whether the benefits were given to 
big business or the ordinary citizen.  The precise questions are presented at the end of the 
table. 
 
The patterns are broadly similar to those in the earlier equations: happy people have 
cheerful dispositions perhaps and happy about most things. The young are most content 
about the positive impact on growth (column 1).  Males, right-wingers and the most 
educated are especially content with the benefits.  Inevitably the unemployed and the 
least educated are the most discontented.  The Danes, the Dutch, the Finns and the 
Swedes are most supportive.  The French and the Greeks are opposed, worrying in part 
about the adverse effect of globalization on social inequalities (column 2) and prices 
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(column 3) and that the benefits are mostly to big firms rather than to the man on the 
street (column 4). 
 
The Germans, who have long been hawkish on inflation, are especially opposed to the 
idea that globalization protects from price increases.  The unemployed are much less 
likely than the employed to agree that globalization helps growth.  The young, the 
educated, men and right-wingers are especially likely to report that globalization helps 
growth. 
 
4.  Policy Responses 
The first policy response to the financial crisis was to adjust monetary policy.  Interest 
rates were reduced to historical lows and some countries tried to offset the reduction in 
credit caused by the difficulties in the banking sector by monetary expansion 
(quantitative easing). 
 
Changes in market sentiment around issues such as the probability of sovereign debt 
default and growth prospects led to substantial currency realignments.  The change in 
nominal exchange rates from 2008 Q1 to 2010 Q3 against the SDR is shown in Figure 4. 
Major changes included the appreciation of the yen.  Despite having the highest national 
debt to GDP ratio in the G20, Japan has a very high domestic savings rate. The result of 
the high degree of market confidence in the yen has led to a considerable loss in 
competitiveness and difficulties for the Japanese labour market.  The UK, in contrast 
experienced a sharp devaluation, substantially reducing its relative labour costs.  How 
elastic is demand?  Changing real wages led to changing migration incentives. 
 
There was widespread unease that countries were attempting to manipulate their 
currencies to boost external demand.  Member countries were encouraged to avoid 
competitive devaluations at the G20 summit meeting in October 2010, but it is not clear 
whether any agreement might hold in the medium to long-term unless the major 
imbalances in the world economy are fixed. 
 
The second response to the crisis came as a result of the operation of automatic 
stabilizers.  As private demand fell, government spending on a variety of social insurance 
schemes increased.  In the immediate aftermath of the crash was the most important of 
these was the impact of unemployment benefits.  Recent OECD research has, however, 
claimed that the unemployment benefit expenditure has been acyclic, because the 
increased number of claim s during a recession has been offset by a reduction in the value 
of benefits to unemployed persons.  Automatic stabilizers differ in their effectiveness. In 
those countries with generous social protection systems, automatic stabilizers are likely to 
have a stronger effect in supporting demand, so lessening the need for discretionary 
measures.  Such countries are typically found in Northern Europe.  For example, the 
Norwegian unemployment benefit system provides prime age unemployed workers with 
72% of their previous income over a period of at least five years.  This contrasts with the 
US, which provides only 28% for one year. 
13 
 
 
The third response was the introduction of discretionary measures to boost aggregate 
demand. The OECD (2009) notes that these made a smaller contribution to maintaining 
output and employment than have automatic stabilizers.  The scale of the intervention 
varied widely both in their composition in respect of spending measures, ranging from 
Korea with a cumulative package worth 6% of GDP over three years, to Switzerland, 
Portugal and France with less than 0.5% of GDP.  The UK and New Zealand are notable 
for attempting the most rapid turnaround from fiscal expansion to contraction.  The 
impact of these measures on the labour market depends on short-run employment 
multipliers, which vary from country to country and on the composition of the stimulus, 
with increased spending likely to have a more positive effect on employment than tax 
reductions (OECD 2009). 
 
We now turn to labour market responses, focusing largely on the advanced countries 
where the effects of the recession have been most acute.  Labour market policy responses 
have comprised both passive and active measures.  The former largely comprise income 
support schemes, while the latter comprise a wide range of measures schemes intended to 
keep or re-integrate individuals within the labour market.  In recent years OECD strategy 
has emphasized the benefits of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) relative to 
passive measures.  Spending on labour market policies is relatively low in countries such 
as the US, the UK, Canada, Japan and Korea, which largely rely on market solutions.  On 
the other hand the Scandinavian countries, Ireland and the Netherlands spend much more 
both on active and passive labour market policies.  Neither group of labour markets has 
performed uniformly better than the other over the last three years.  And in both groups, 
spending per unemployed person actually declined during the recession (OECD 2009).  
 
Many OECD countries have taken measures to cushion the effect of job loss by 
decreasing the generosity of unemployment benefits and/or social assistance.  A number 
of countries have also extended support for those seeking jobs.  Some have increased the 
conditionality of income support by requiring the unemployed to increase their job search 
activity.  Resources for training and retraining have been in a large majority of OECD 
countries.  
 
Schemes to support short time working (STW) and so avoid layoffs have been introduced 
or reinstated in a number of countries.  Finally, measures to reduce non-wage labour costs 
and so move encourage employers to substitute labour for capital. However, the 
additional discretionary spend on these ALMPs in response to the recession has been 
very small.  In the UK, it measured 0.1% of GDP and in the US 0.01% of GDP. The 
highest spenders were Portugal and Poland who committed more than 0.3% of GDP to 
these programs. The OECD (2009) used cross-country variation in STW to identify the 
effects of these policies. It finds that these schemes helped preserve permanent jobs 
during the downturn. They did not, however, help maintain temporary employment and 
their effect on the responsiveness of wages to the cycle is unclear. 
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Reductions in social security contributions were also used as a measure to stimulate 
employment.  The OECD evidence suggests that these may be useful in stimulating short-
run demand but in the long run are very expensive as mechanisms for increasing 
employment, with the long-run elasticity of employment with respect to labour costs 
being around 0.2 for OECD countries.  
 
Clearly there has been a strong political pressure in many countries to "do something" 
about the sharp rise in unemployment.  Due to their expansion in recent decades, ALMPs 
now form part of the standard policy toolkit.  But the evidence for their efficacy is 
somewhat mixed.  Card et al. (2010) conduct a meta-analysis of 199 different ALMPs. 
They find that the proportion of evaluation studies of these programs that yield positive 
results rises through time.  Thus while only 39.1% yield significantly positive outcomes 
in the short-term, 45.4% yield positive medium-term impacts and 52.9% significantly 
positive long-term effects. Clearly there are large numbers of programs that are not 
successful in improving labour market outcomes.  The speed at which the labour market 
dipped gave governments little time to evaluate new policy interventions. Therefore it is 
no surprise that ALMPs formed a large part of the discretionary response to rising 
unemployment.  
 
However, some countries have placed deficit reduction as their policy imperative. Some, 
like Ireland and Greece, have had little option due to sovereign debt crises.  The UK 
government argues that it will have a sovereign debt crisis unless it adopts draconian 
fiscal cutbacks.  As a result, the UK has abandoned some ALMPs such as the educational 
maintenance allowance (EMA), which was intended to encourage children from poorer 
backgrounds to stay at school to age 18.   It has also cut the Future Jobs Fund which was 
intended to support 150,000 jobs for those aged under 25.  University places have been 
cut back and tuition fees increased substantially. The outcome of the UK experiment in 
significantly reducing ALMPs will be viewed with interest in other countries.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
The timing of the shocks to trade and output caused by the financial crisis was closely 
aligned across countries, leading to the “Great Synchronisation”.  However, in terms of 
size and persistence of the recessionary impact, it is the developed world, and particularly 
European countries, that have been most adversely affected.  Even within Europe there is 
no consistent pattern.  Some countries, especially those hit hard by the decline in world 
trade, such as Germany and Sweden have bounced back quickly.  In other European 
countries, output is still significantly lower than its pre-recession level.  There is a 
widespread concern in Europe and in the US that the recovery will be too weak to 
generate many jobs and therefore high levels of unemployment will persist, as they did in 
the 1980s. 
 
The scale of impacts on the labour market has differed widely.  For example, the UK had 
twice as big a drop in output as the US, but a much smaller increase in unemployment.  
As yet, there is not much evidence of a “discouraged worker effect”, though this may 
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change as unemployment durations increase.  Governments have responded to the crisis 
with monetary and fiscal policies, some of which may have helped maintain employment. 
Automatic stabilizers have also had an important role in maintaining demand and 
supporting the income of the unemployed.  They have also introduced, or expanded, a 
wide range of ALMPs.  The effectiveness of these measures undoubtedly varies widely, 
but the downturn in the labour market happened so rapidly that there was little time to 
conduct extensive evaluations.  Rather, governments had to rely on evidence from pre-
recession labour markets.  However, the resources devoted to these measures has not 
increased as rapidly as has the level of unemployment, implying spend per unemployed 
person has fallen. 
 
Some countries have decided to reduce spending on ALMPs, even though they are 
confronted by a large increase in unemployment.  These encompass countries that have 
real sovereign debt difficulties, including Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece.  Some 
countries are concerned that they may experience similar problems and have introduced 
fiscal austerity measures to reassure the capital markets.  Labour market measures tend 
not to have a high political priority in times of fiscal stringency and thus are unlikely to 
be immune from budget cuts.  For example, in the UK, spending on ALMPs has been 
reduced but government spending on health continues to increase.    
 
We have added to the evidence on the impacts of the recession in a number of ways. 
Following our previous work showing how much those aged 16 to 24 have suffered in 
terms of greater unemployment and underemployment during the Great Recession, we 
have found that the young have been more likely to accept work at lower skill levels than 
they might had not jobs been in short supply.  This may contribute to the scarring effects 
of joining the labour market while the economy is in recession. 
 
We have found that the unemployed, the young and left wingers wish governments would 
do more to create jobs.  Those living in Mediterranean countries have become 
increasingly pessimistic about job prospects.  The Greeks, Irish and Italians think the 
worst of the crisis is yet to come. 
 
We have also discovered that in countries where output fell sharply and there was a 
significant deterioration in the labour market, happiness has declined and opposition to 
globalization increased, although Ireland is an exception.  The unemployed have 
becoming increasingly unhappy, perhaps reflecting their increasing awareness of the 
difficulties of finding a job.  A major concern going forward is that if the recovery is 
jobless there will be growing demands for protectionism, especially in countries where 
inequalities are widening.   
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Figure 1: Short-Term Trade Finance in OECD Countries 2005-2009 
 
 
Source: OECD  
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MEI_TRD) 
 
Figure 2: Growth in World Trade 2008Q1-2010-Q3 
 
 
 
Source: World Trade Organisation  
(http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBViewData.aspx?Language=E) 
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Figure 3: Output Growth By Major Economic Areas 
 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database January 2011 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/index.aspx). Data for 2010 
and 2011 are forecasts based on information available until the end of 2010. 
 
 
Figure 4: Change in Nominal Exchange Rate against SDR 2008 Q1 to 2010 Q3 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Financial Statistics, Accessed January 2011 
 
20 
Figure 5: Time Dummies by Age Group in Skills Regression 2005-2010 
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Table 1: Change in Output 2008Q1 to low point of recession and from 2008Q1 to 
2010 Q3 
 Change in Output (%) 
 2008 Q1 - low point 2008 Q1 - 2010 Q3 
India 0.0% 15.6% 
Indonesia 0.0% 13.7% 
Brazil -2.0% 8.1% 
Poland 0.0% 7.4% 
Korea -4.3% 5.9% 
Australia 0.0% 4.7% 
South Africa -1.1% 1.8% 
New Zealand -1.7% 1.2% 
Switzerland -2.8% 0.8% 
Slovak Republic -4.8% 0.8% 
Turkey -12.6% 0.4% 
Canada -3.2% 0.3% 
Sweden -6.6% 0.0% 
United States -4.0% -0.5% 
Belgium -3.7% -0.7% 
Mexico -8.5% -0.9% 
Portugal -3.6% -1.2% 
Czech Republic -4.1% -1.8% 
France -3.9% -1.8% 
Austria -4.8% -1.8% 
Germany -6.6% -1.8% 
Norway -2.6% -2.6% 
Luxembourg -7.9% -2.6% 
Netherlands -5.3% -2.8% 
Denmark -6.7% -3.3% 
Japan -10.1% -3.4% 
United Kingdom -6.5% -3.9% 
Spain -4.9% -4.5% 
Russia -9.9% -5.1% 
Italy -6.8% -5.4% 
Finland -9.7% -5.5% 
Greece -6.8% -6.8% 
Hungary -7.9% -7.2% 
Ireland -11.9% -11.0% 
Iceland -12.1% -11.1% 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and CIA World Factbook  
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Table 2. Change in Unemployment, Employment and Labour Force 2008Q1 to 2010Q3 
 Employment Unemployment 
Labour 
Force 
 2010 Q3 Change
% 
Change 2010 Q3Change
% 
Change % Change 
Australia 11,291 534 5.0% 591 89 17.8% 5.5% 
Austria 4,148 132 3.3% 191 16 9.0% 3.5% 
Belgium 4,488 39 0.9% 424 87 25.8% 2.6% 
Canada 17,383 594 3.5% 1,543 418 37.1% 5.6% 
Czech Republic 4,897 -46 -0.9% 374 130 53.0% 1.6% 
Denmark 2,726 -83 -3.0% 214 114 114.8% 1.1% 
Finland 2,479 15 0.6% 195 19 11.0% 1.3% 
France    2,596 529 25.6% 2.6% 
Germany 38,915 576 1.5% 2,797 -613 -18.0% -0.1% 
Greece 4,403 -109 -2.4% 622 215 53.0% 2.2% 
Hungary 3,798 -13 -0.3% 466 133 39.9% 2.9% 
Iceland 170 -4 -2.2% 12 8 178.6% 2.1% 
Ireland 1,852 -284 -13.3% 294 191 183.8% -4.2% 
Italy 22,789 -382 -1.6% 1,864 103 5.8% -1.1% 
Japan 62,860 -303 -0.5% 3,360 727 27.6% -1.0% 
Korea 24,120 1,069 4.6% 873 72 9.0% 4.8% 
Mexico 44,365 1,375 3.2% 2,466 695 39.3% 4.6% 
Netherlands 8,545 43 0.5% 368 94 34.0% 1.6% 
New Zealand 2,182 25 1.2% 145 49 50.5% 3.3% 
Norway 2,500 19 0.8% 92 27 41.5% 1.7% 
Poland 16,199 684 4.4% 1,627 266 19.5% 5.6% 
Portugal 4,940 -216 -4.2% 609 182 42.7% -0.6% 
Slovak Republic 2,335 -56 -2.4% 384 104 37.1% 1.8% 
Spain 18,547 -1,856 -9.1% 4,575 2,401 110.4% 2.4% 
Sweden 4,639 119 2.6% 390 89 29.4% 4.3% 
Switzerland 4,618 113 2.5% 210 48 29.4% 3.4% 
Turkey 23,195 3,331 16.8% 2,971 294 11.0% 16.1% 
United Kingdom 29,244 -193 -0.7% 2,545 943 58.9% 2.4% 
United States 139,923 -4,832 -3.3% 14,679 6,612 82.0% 1.2% 
Euro area  141,558 -2,121 -1.5% 15,148 3,438 29.4% 0.8% 
European Union  217,923 -1,790 -0.8% 22,237 5,605 33.7% 1.6% 
G7 337,028 -4,360 -1.3% 29,383 8,718 42.2% 0.9% 
Source: OECD 
Notes: Numbers and changes are measured in thousands. Data for Mexico, the 
Netherlands, OECD Europe and OECD total relate to Quarter 2, 2010 
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Table 3.  Unemployment Rates 2010 Quarter 3, ranked by youth unemployment rates 
 
Adults (age 
25+) Youths (age 15-24)
Youths  
ISCED 0-2 
Youth/Adult 
Rate 
Norway 2.7 8.3 9.4 3.07 
Germany 6.5 8.7 14.3 1.34 
Netherlands 3.7 8.7 12.0 2.35 
Austria 3.8 9.0 12.5 2.37 
Malta 5.4 12.2 13.3 2.26 
Denmark 6.1 14.7 16.0 2.41 
Slovenia 6.6 14.8 18.6 2.24 
Luxembourg 3.9 16.3 23.5 4.18 
Czech Republic 6.2 18.1 40.4 2.92 
United States 8.2 18.2 n/a 2.22 
United Kingdom 5.8 19.1 33.6 3.29 
Turkey 8.8 19.4 14.7 2.20 
Cyprus 5.6 19.5 10.6 3.48 
Euro area  8.9 20.1 26.2 2.26 
European Union  8.3 20.5 27.0 2.47 
Finland 6.6 20.9 20.6 3.17 
Belgium 7.1 21.6 33.3 3.04 
Romania 5.8 21.7 16.7 3.74 
Bulgaria 9.0 22.2 36.8 2.47 
Portugal 10.1 23.0 22.7 2.28 
France 8.1 23.9 37.5 2.95 
Poland 8.0 23.9 27.1 2.99 
Sweden 5.8 24.8 31.5 4.28 
Hungary 9.9 26.2 39.8 2.65 
Ireland 12.2 27.1 44.6 2.22 
Italy 7.0 27.1 27.3 3.87 
Estonia 14.9 28.0 45.9 1.88 
Latvia 16.2 33.3 42.4 2.06 
Greece 11.5 33.4 30.6 2.90 
Slovakia 12.4 34.3 63.5 2.77 
Lithuania 16.6 35.2 44.2 2.12 
Spain 18.4 42.4 48.7 2.30 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: ISCED 0-2 covers those whose highest level of education is pre-primary, primary 
or lower-secondary education 
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Table 4.  Skills Demand and the Recession – Ordered Logit Results 
                                               Ages 16-24            Ages 25-49              Ages 50+ 
Gender -0.463 (45.1)-0.833 (113.6)-0.849 (181.0) 
First Degree -1.548 (30.7)-0.736 (37.99)-0.882 (82.36) 
HNC/HND Equivalent -2.411 (44.9)-1.501 (79.23)-1.734 (151.7) 
NVQ Level_3 -2.967 (60.3)-2.395 (129.1)-2.408 (222.9) 
Trade Apprenticeship -2.064 (36.8)-2.775 (139.9)-2.591 (189.6) 
O-Level or Equivalent -3.212 (65.2)-2.983 (161.5)-3.004 (280.8) 
Other Qualifications -3.541 (68.4)-3.546 (186.0)-3.411 (287.8) 
No Qualifications -3.867 (73.2)-3.860 (201.9)-3.786 (289.3) 
2008 Q1 -.020 (0.58)-.052 (2.11)-.021 (1.31) 
2008 Q2 -.021 (0.61)-.034 (1.40)-.023 (1.44) 
2008 Q3 -.048 (1.37)-.024 (0.96)-.013 (0.80) 
2008 Q4 -.057 (1.63)-.036 (1.46)-.017 (1.09) 
2009 Q1 -.002 (0.06)-.051 (2.07)-.023 (1.45) 
2009 Q2 -.054 (1.49)-.061 (2.46)-.034 (2.13) 
2009 Q3 -.084 (2.31)-.067 (2.7)-.044 (2.71) 
2009 Q4 -.097 (2.67)-.087 (3.51)-.057 (3.51) 
2010 Q1 -.113 (3.09)-.085 (3.44)-.064 (3.92) 
2010 Q2 -.127 (3.48)-.081 (3.28)-.072 (4.47) 
       
cut1 -5.020  -6.103  -6.126 
cut2 -2.684  -3.761  -3.794 
cut3 -0.780  -2.169  -2.146 
N       141,232  310,893  717,591  
LR chi2       18,311   115,505   240,500 
Pseudo R2            .054   .141   .129    
             
Source: UK Labour Force Surveys 2005-2010. 
Notes: Omitted Categories - Males, Higher Degree, Whites, North East of England and 
2005 Q1.  Only the time dummies from 2008Q1 to 2010Q2 are shown.  The values of the 
full sets of time dummies are shown in Figure 5. 
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Table 5.  Happiness and jobs, 2007 & 2010 (OLS) 
             Life satisfaction         Employment situation  
 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Age 15-24  .1327 (6.86)  .1803 (9.23) -.0120 (0.68)   .0247 (1.47) 
Age 25-34  .0488 (3.39)  .0587 (4.12)  -.0064 (0.49)  -.0138 (1.13) 
Age 45-54  -.0552 (4.00)  -.0703 (5.10) -.0388 (3.10)   -.0450 (3.79) 
Age 55-64  .0034 (0.23) -.0216 (1.42) -.0205 (1.49)  -.0271 (2.08) 
Age ≥65 .0843 (4.60)  .0619 (3.36)  .0175 (1.05)   .0274 (1.72) 
Male  -.0117 (1.39) -.0216 (2.56)  .0513 (6.64)   .0513 (7.03) 
ALS 16-19  .1244 (10.35)  .1110 (9.12)  .0750 (6.85)    .0434 (4.10) 
ALS ≥20  .2645 (19.63)  .2818 (20.78)  .1729 (14.07)   .1180 (10.01) 
Still studying  .2811 (11.79)  .2777 (11.79)   .1996 (9.16)   .1211 (5.92) 
No FT education -.0264 (0.61) -.1753 (3.89) -.0391 (0.96)   .0702 (1.73) 
Politics 3-4  .0072 (0.43)  .0282 (1.59)  .0633 (4.06)   .0719 (4.66) 
Politics Centre .0555 (3.56)   .1056 (6.52)  .0582 (4.08)   .0952 (6.77) 
Politics 7-8  .0822 (4.71)  .1439 (8.05)  .1244 (7.83)   .1535 (9.90) 
Politics Right  .1516 (7.69)  .2019 (9.74)  .0993 (5.52)   .1319 (7.31) 
Origin other EU-.0222 (0.83) -.0233 (0.96)  .0800 (3.24)    .1457 (6.70) 
Europe not EU.0190 (0.59) -.0788 (2.34)  .0680 (2.31)  -.0080 (0.27) 
Asia/Africa origin-.0897 (2.32) -.1247 (3.34)  .1019 (2.89)    .0652 (2.03) 
USA/Japan origin .1231 (1.10)  .1517 (1.32)  .1191 (1.19)   .0602 (0.60) 
Home account -.0264 (1.58)  -.0620 (3.61) -.0520 (3.41)  -.0557 (3.73) 
Unemployed  -.3650 (22.99) -.4166 (28.23)  -.2408 (16.74)  -.2191 (17.27) 
Retired -.0974 (6.57)   -.1014 (6.78)  -.0850 (6.27)   -.0965 (7.45) 
Austria  -.1609 (5.16)  -.1386 (4.77)  .2552 (9.01)   .4064 (16.35) 
Bulgaria  -.9219 (28.88) -1.0384 (35.59) -.2403 (8.27)  -.4921 (19.75) 
Croatia  -.1916 (6.10)  -.3645 (12.39) -.5304 (18.57)  -.6306 (25.29) 
Cyprus  -.0043 (0.11) -.1694 (4.63)  .2913 (8.28)   .1679 (5.29) 
Czech Republic-.2577 (8.33) -.3766 (13.04) -.2296 (8.20)  -.2882 (11.70) 
Denmark  .4419 (14.17)  .3523 (12.18)  .5008 (17.70)   .4336 (17.50) 
East Germany -.3028 (8.05) -.3999 (10.85) -.1964 (5.73)  -.0664 (2.11) 
Estonia  -.4124 (13.22) -.5060 (17.45) -.2584 (9.07)   -.2982 (12.00) 
Finland  .1060 (3.42)  .0013 (0.05)  .1987 (7.07)   .2323 (9.43) 
France  -.2428 (7.89) -.2602 (9.08) -.3787 (13.57)  -.2712 (11.06) 
Greece  -.7029 (22.50) -.9780 (33.63) -.5140 (18.17)  -.5331 (21.47) 
Hungary  -.7658 (24.59) -.8158 (28.19) -.5758 (20.41)   -.4147 (16.77) 
Ireland  .1626 (5.18)  .0230 (0.79) -.7427 (26.15)  -.6732 (27.17) 
Italy  -.5392 (17.36) -.4906 (16.94) -.3258 (11.59)  -.2038 (8.21) 
Latvia  -.6826 (21.79) -.6463 (22.30) -.6729 (23.70)  -.5350 (21.57) 
Lithuania  -.7067 (22.59) -.7812 (26.90) -.3956 (13.82)  -.4273 (17.17) 
Luxembourg  .2281 (5.96)  .0957 (2.59)   .2067 (5.92)   .4972 (15.62) 
Macedonia  -.5191 (16.53) -.6295 (21.78) -.5993 (21.03)  -.5273 (21.29) 
Malta  -.0288 (0.74) -.2566 (6.88)  .0712 (1.93)   .2021 (6.15) 
Netherlands  .2927 (9.54)  .1163 (4.06)  .4157 (14.92)    .5284 (21.43) 
Poland  -.3490 (11.08) -.3614 (12.38)  -.0997 (3.46)  -.0332 (1.32) 
Portugal  -.6679 (20.95) -.8385 (28.61) -.5745 (19.93)  -.4044 (16.16) 
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Romania  -.6628 (21.23) -1.1454 (39.42) -.4785 (16.66)  -.5923 (23.69) 
Slovakia  -.3775 (2.17) -.3848 (13.36) -.3588 (12.70)  -.2700 (10.98) 
Slovenia  -.0729 (2.34) -.1762 (6.08) -.1794 (6.33)  -.3168 (12.76) 
Spain  -.1396 (4.45) -.2410 (8.28) -.5107 (17.96)  -.5672 (22.83) 
Sweden  .2775 (8.94)  .1436 (5.05) -.0249 (0.89)   .3750 (15.41) 
Turkey  -.5089 (15.82) -.4883 (16.17) -.4988 (17.10)  -.1241 (4.76) 
UK  .1416 (4.86)  .1230 (4.59) -.3489 (13.18)  -.0737 (3.19) 
West Germany -.0900 (2.90) -.1236 (4.30)  .0383 (1.36)   .1019 (4.14) 
Constant  2.9592   3.0531    1.9694   1.8385 
N    29517   30580  28939 29659 
Adjusted R2 .2671 .2911  .2624 .2948 
 
Source: Eurobarometers #68.1, September-October 2007 and #73.4, May 2010 
Notes: excluded categories, employed; Belgium; Age Left School (ALS) <16; age 35-44; 
Politics - left and origin 'in our country'.  Asia and Africa also includes Latin America 
USA/Japan means North America and also includes Oceania. T-statistics in parentheses. 
Question 1. On the whole, are you not at all satisfied (=1), not very satisfied (=2), fairly 
satisfied (=3) or very satisfied (=4) with the life you lead? 
Question 2.  How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? The 
employment situation in (our country) - very bad (=1); rather bad (=2); rather good (=3) 
and very good (=4). 
 
Life satisfaction  scores                        2010              2007                       change 
Greece 2.24 2.68 -0.44 
Romania 2.08 2.39 -0.31 
Lithuania 2.44 2.63 -0.19 
Portugal 2.29 2.47 -0.18 
Spain 2.9 3.07 -0.17 
Turkey 2.7 2.87 -0.17 
Latvia 2.59 2.68 -0.09 
Malta 2.93 3.02 -0.09 
Italy 2.72 2.79 -0.07 
Slovenia 3.04 3.1 -0.06 
Turkish Cyprus 2.76 2.82 -0.06 
Belgium 3.13 3.18 -0.05 
Czech Republic 2.86 2.91 -0.05 
Macedonia 2.49 2.54 -0.05 
Luxembourg 3.36 3.39 -0.03 
Estonia 2.77 2.8 -0.03 
Netherlands 3.41 3.44 -0.03 
Austria 3.07 3.07 0 
Croatia 2.81 2.81 0 
Hungary 2.38 2.38 0 
France 2.98 2.97 0.01 
Cyprus 3.06 3.05 0.01 
Denmark 3.66 3.65 0.01 
Bulgaria 2.17 2.15 0.02 
Poland 2.88 2.85 0.03 
Ireland 3.24 3.21 0.03 
East Germany 2.75 2.7 0.05 
Finland 3.3 3.25 0.05 
West Germany 3.1 3.05 0.05 
Sweden 3.44 3.38 0.06 
United Kingdom 3.32 3.22 0.10 
Slovakia 2.85 2.74 0.11
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Table 6.  Expectations for jobs and public role in creating jobs, 2007 & 2010 (OLS) 
  Expectations for employment      Job crisis to worsen   Create jobs 
 2007 2010 2010 2010 
Age 15-24   .1641 (8.82)  .0929 (4.45)  -.0579 (4.01)  .1261 (4.77)  
Age 25-34   .0766 (5.55)  .0647 (4.24)  -.0256 (2.43)  .0505 (2.66)  
Age 45-54  -.0332 (2.51) -.0669 (4.55)   .0198 (1.96)  .0265 (1.45)  
Age 55-64  -.0576 (3.95) -.0686 (4.24)   .0225 (2.01)  .0367 (1.81)  
Age ≥65 -.0192 (1.09) -.0469 (2.37)  -.0056 (0.42)  .0566 (2.26)  
Male  -.0151 (1.86)  .0298 (3.30)  -.0242 (3.89) -.0232 (2.06)  
ALS 16-19   .0227 (1.95)  .0076 (0.58)  -.0408 (4.43) -.0155 (0.92)  
ALS ≥20   .0059 (0.45)  .0801 (5.47)   -.0968 (9.47)  -.0687 (3.74)  
Still studying   .0854 (3.70)  .1096 (4.32)  -.0872 (4.96) -.0634 (1.99)  
No FT education  .0645 (1.49)   .0197 (0.39)   .0150 (0.43) -.0188 (0.27)  
Politics 3-4   .0257 (1.57)  .0651 (3.40)  -.0583 (4.36) -.0711 (3.02)  
Politics Centre .0356 (2.37)  .0821 (4.71)  -.0877 (7.22) -.0749 (3.50)  
Politics 7-8   .0392 (2.35)  .1451 (7.55)  -.1258 (9.38) -.0826 (3.51)  
Politics Right  .0957 (5.03)  .1542 (6.90)  -.1267 (8.16) -.0264 (0.97)  
Origin other EU .0585 (2.25)  .1240 (4.59)  -.0486 (2.67)  .0477 (1.49)  
Europe not EU  .0357 (1.15)  .0299 (0.82)   .0238 (0.97)   .2660 (5.83)  
Asia/Africa origin .1717 (4.61)  .0136 (0.34)  -.0412 (1.51)  .1168 (2.36)  
USA/Japan origin -.0478 (0.46)  .1752 (1.44)  -.0981 (1.10)   .1936 (1.22)  
Home account  .0344 (2.12) -.0358 (1.92)   .0169 (1.31) -.0157 (0.65)  
Unemployed   .0242 (1.59) -.0419 (2.67)   .0844 (7.83)  .0718 (3.59)  
Retired   .0138 (0.97) -.0086 (0.54)   .0267 (2.42) -.0261 (1.30)  
Austria   .1263 (4.23)  .1209 (3.94)  -.0540 (2.53)  .1338 (3.58)  
Bulgaria   .0577 (1.88)  .0098 (0.31)  -.1789 (7.87)  .1513 (3.48)  
Croatia  -.0287 (0.96) -.2413 (7.84)   .0356 (1.70)  .2471 (6.51)  
Cyprus  -.1010 (2.71) -.3817 (9.56)   .1650 (6.38)  .0757 (1.56)  
Czech Republic-.1135 (3.86) -.1386 (4.57)  -.0583 (2.81)  .1199 (3.23)  
Denmark  -.0473 (1.60)  .4141 (13.62)  -.1706 (8.11)  .2575 (6.99)  
East Germany -.0459 (1.27)   -.1988 (5.09)   .1489 (5.59) -.1595 (3.35)  
Estonia  -.0413 (1.38)  .3689 (12.04)  -.1800 (8.57)  -.0289 (0.74)  
Finland   -.0111 (0.38)  .1832 (6.06)  -.0477 (2.31)  .2642 (7.13)  
France   .1312 (4.47) -.0975 (3.21)   .1031 (5.08) -.2077 (5.49)  
Greece   -.0786 (2.65) -.5333 (17.48)   .1811 (9.00) -.2542 (6.80)  
Hungary  -.1152 (3.89)  .1725 (5.66)  -.2113 (9.99) -.0313 (0.84)  
Ireland  -.2512 (8.39) -.1364 (4.46)   .0501 (2.42)  .3656 (9.30)  
Italy   .1748 (5.88) -.0830 (2.71)  -.0614 (2.86) -.0564 (1.44)  
Latvia  -.0574 (1.91)  .1248 (4.07)  -.0034 (0.16) -.2309 (6.04)  
Lithuania  -.1737 (5.78) -.1423 (4.61)    .0522 (2.52)  .2936 (7.65)  
Luxembourg  -.0058 (0.16)  -.2922 (7.46)   .1659 (6.51)  .1510 (3.17)  
Macedonia   .2362 (7.87)  -.1000 (3.28) -.0949 (4.49)  .5913 (15.24  
Malta   .1767 (4.41)  .1975 (4.71)  -.1350 (4.80) -.0508 (0.99)  
Netherlands  -.1834 (6.28)  .1200 (3.96)  -.0299 (1.45)  -.2115 (5.72)  
Poland   .1107 (3.66)  .0476 (1.53)  -.0820 (3.78)  .2080 (5.34)  
Portugal  -.1460 (4.77) -.2940 (9.47)   .1445 (6.93)  .0337 (0.84)  
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Romania    .0707 (2.34) -.4208 (13.61)   .1760 (8.49)  .3495 (8.59)  
Slovakia  -.1425 (4.80) -.0488 (1.61)  -.1064 (5.09)  .3948 (10.57) 
Slovenia   .0653 (2.19) -.1499 (4.90)   .0345 (1.67) -.1599 (4.30)  
Spain   .1396 (4.64)   .0194 (0.63)   .0032 (0.15)  .0045 (0.12)  
Sweden   .1257 (4.25)  .6434 (21.48)  -.2109 (10.24)  .2917 (8.05)  
Turkey   .1388 (4.48) -.0771 (2.37)   .0277 (1.25)  -.0484 (1.18)  
UK  -.0216 (0.78)   .1069 (3.75)   .0215 (1.12)  .2064 (5.92)  
West Germany  .0190 (0.64) -.0128 (0.42)   .0583 (2.81) -.2708 (7.32)  
Constant  1.3660   1.7551      2.628 
N 28,335                  28,872    28,360                   
25,418 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2.0491 .1185 .0569 .0627 
 
Source: Eurobarometers #68.1, September-October 2007 and #73.4, May 2010 
Notes: excluded categories, employed; Belgium; Age Left School (ALS) <16; age 35-44; 
Politics - left and origin 'in our country'.  Asia and Africa also includes Latin America 
USA/Japan means North America and also includes Oceania. Column 3 estimated as a 
dprobit. T-statistics in parentheses. 
Question 1. What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve 
months be worse (=1), the same (=2) or better (=3), when it comes to...the employment 
situation in (our country)? 
Question 2. Some analysts say that the impact of the economic crisis on the job market 
has already reached its peak and things will recover little by little. Others, on the 
contrary, say that the worst is still to come. Which of the two statements is closer to your 
opinion? 'The impact of the crisis on jobs has already reached its peak' (=0) or  'the worst 
is still to come' (=1). 
Question 3.  In an international financial and economic crisis, it is necessary to increase 
public deficits to create jobs: totally disagree (=1); tend to disagree (=2); tend to agree 
(=3); totally agree (=4)? 
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Table 7. Views on globalization - % saying they agree or totally agree, 2010 
. 
                                          Growth               Inequalities               Prices                   Profits 
Austria   64.1 75.5 26.9 79.1 
Belgium   64.6 74.9 28.8 75.2 
Bulgaria   73.3 73.3 32.3 79.2 
Croatia   68.9 76.0 35.2 78.9 
Cyprus    62.9 80.9 35.5 82.0 
Czech Republic   60.0 68.9 33.1 70.4 
Denmark   90.5 57.3 35.7 50.4 
East Germany    66.5 77.0 20.8 73.7 
Estonia   75.3 63.9 29.6 65.2 
Finland   76.8 68.2 39.1 63.4 
France   51.5 84.9 13.5 85.5 
Great Britain   78.4 65.9 35.0 74.7 
Greece   43.0 84.0 20.8 82.7 
Hungary   76.0 79.6 29.8 74.1 
Iceland   77.0 49.8 38.9 50.3 
Ireland   75.3 71.6 33.5 76.9 
Italy   61.8 65.0 44.7 68.8 
Latvia   60.8 69.5 25.4 74.0 
Lithuania   73.5 62.1 33.7 75.6 
Luxembourg  67.1 75.3 27.1 72.3 
Macedonia   69.0 70.3 38.1 79.0 
Malta   87.9 52.9 52.4 65.4 
Netherlands   83.6 52.5 37.0 51.9 
Northern Ireland    77.0 75.2 30.2 73.9 
Poland   69.3 72.6 43.4 77.2 
Portugal   56.0 69.7 30.8 72.4 
Romania   67.9 69.6 42.0 71.1 
Slovakia   78.9 73.2 50.1 72.7 
Slovenia   66.4 82.8 28.9 85.2 
Spain   67.3 77.8 36.5 82.7 
Sweden   87.3 56.0 38.4 50.4 
Turkey   65.5 56.8 52.1 67.4 
Turkish Cyprus    76.2 62.9 54.2 60.6 
West Germany    69.5 76.6 25.1 68.1 
 
Questions. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally 
disagree (=1), tend to disagree (=2), tend to agree (=3) or totally agree (=4)? 
Column 1. Globalization is an opportunity for economic growth? 
Column 2. Globalization increases social inequalities? 
Column 3. Globalization protects us from price increases? 
Column 4. Globalization is profitable only for large companies, not for citizens? 
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Table 8.  Views on globalization, 2010 (OLS). 
 Growth Inequalities Prices Profits 
Age 15-24   .0758 (3.26)  -.0376 (1.56)  .0979 (3.84) -.0756 (3.07)  
Age 25-34   .0260 (1.55)  .0080 (0.46)  .0380 (2.07) -.0171 (0.96)  
Age 45-54    -.0158 (0.98)   .0375 (2.24) -.0268 (1.51)  .0504 (2.92)  
Age 55-64  -.0064 (0.36)  .0330 (1.78) -.0150 (0.76)  .0662 (3.48)  
Age ≥65  .0248 (1.11)  .0097 (0.42)  .0491 (2.01)  .0800 (3.38)  
Male   .0417 (4.16) -.0035 (0.34)   .0451 (4.12) -.0027 (0.26)  
ALS 16-19   .0524 (3.47) -.0219 (1.41)  .0192 (1.17) -.0482 (3.05)  
ALS ≥20   .1473 (8.93) -.0698 (4.11)  .0337 (1.88) -.1719 (9.91)  
Still studying   .1630 (5.80) -.1286 (4.40)  .0972 (3.15) -.1952 (6.54)  
No FT education  .0106 (0.16) -.0642 (0.92)  .0635 (0.87) -.0976 (1.33)  
Politics (3-4)   .0948 (4.56) -.1056 (4.92)  .0836 (3.68) -.1041 (4.73)  
Politics Centre .0999 (5.25) -.1502 (7.65)  .1280 (6.16) -.1268 (6.31)  
Politics (7-8)   .2030 (9.71) -.1981 (9.18)  .2064 (9.02) -.2256 (10.19  
Politics Right  .1773 (7.24) -.1818 (7.20)  .2160 (8.10) -.1918 (7.41)  
Origin other EU .0211 (0.75) -.0138 (0.47)  .0857 (2.76)  .0071 (0.24)  
Europe not EU .0703 (1.75)  .1291 (3.11)  .0796 (1.79)  .0404 (0.96)  
Asia/Africa origin .0236 (0.54)   .0818 (1.80)  .2190 (4.54)  .1268 (2.75)  
USA/Japan origin  .1764 (1.24)  .0134 (0.09)  .2783 (1.80)  -.3396 (2.31)  
Home account  .0216 (1.01) -.0659 (2.94) -.0148 (0.63) -.0201 (0.88)  
Unemployed  -.0570 (3.22)  .0273 (1.49) -.0353 (1.82)  .0447 (2.40)  
Retired  -.0216 (1.20)  .0216 (1.16) -.0338 (1.72)   .0165 (0.87)  
Austria   .0197 (0.60)  .1246 (3.67)  -.0731 (2.04)  .1837 (5.26)  
Bulgaria   .1165 (3.30)  .0293 (0.81) -.0006 (0.02)  .1788 (4.85)  
Croatia    .0710 (2.09)  .1028 (2.93) -.0065 (0.18)  .2228 (6.19)  
Cyprus   .0014 (0.03)   .2503 (5.57)  .0550 (1.18)  .3114 (6.84)  
Czech Republic-.0870 (2.60) -.0358 (1.04)  .0556 (1.53)  -.0414 (1.17)  
Denmark   .4223 (12.83)  -.2361 (6.86)  .0405 (1.12) -.3693 (10.48) 
East Germany  .1148 (2.75)  .1244 (2.90) -.2205 (4.89)  .0715 (1.63)  
Estonia   .1477 (4.33) -.0996 (2.80) -.0272 (0.73) -.0701 (1.93)  
Finland    .2036 (6.14) -.0251 (0.74)  .0709 (1.96) -.1439 (4.09)  
France  -.2737 (8.13)  .2819 (8.26) -.4074 (11.25)  .2907 (8.30)  
Greece   -.3430 (10.44)  .3562 (10.51) -.2363 (6.58)  .3485 (10.01) 
Hungary   .1475 (4.43)  .1752 (5.07) -.1758 (4.83)  .0431 (1.22)  
Ireland   .1988 (5.71) -.0186 (0.51)  .0052 (0.14)  .0799 (2.15)  
Italy  -.0503 (1.46) -.1606 (4.49)   .2020 (5.37) -.0936 (2.56)  
Latvia  -.0809 (2.33) -.0199 (0.55) -.1341 (3.53)  .0524 (1.43)  
Lithuania   .1095 (3.06) -.2318 (6.19)  .0493 (1.26)  .0338 (0.90)  
Luxembourg  -.0184 (0.43)  .1029 (2.32) -.0955 (2.06) -.0326 (0.72)  
Macedonia    .1537 (4.49)  .0292 (0.83)  .1020 (2.72)  .2376 (6.58)  
Malta   .4280 (8.73) -.3305 (6.36)  .3326 (6.03) -.1605 (2.93)  
Netherlands   .2457 (7.48)  -.2755 (7.98)  .0927 (2.53) -.3232 (9.16)  
Poland   .0301 (0.85)  .0467 (1.27)  .2128 (5.45)  .1202 (3.24)  
Portugal  -.1056 (3.00) -.1179 (3.26)  .0318 (0.84) -.0097 (0.27)  
Romania   .0163 (0.45) -.0112 (0.30)  .1732 (4.38) -.0449 (1.17)  
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Slovakia    .1997 (5.95) -.0056 (0.16)  .3315 (9.05) -.0298 (0.84)  
Slovenia   .0356 (1.06)  .3022 (8.80) -.0482 (1.33)  .3445 (9.79)  
Spain   .0267 (0.77)  .1045 (2.90)  .0392 (1.01)  .2252 (6.11)  
Sweden   .3908 (12.05)  -.2844 (8.40)  .0453 (1.27) -.4435 (12.86) 
Turkey   .1143 (3.05) -.1156 (2.95)  .3789 (9.04)  .0196 (0.48)  
Turkish Cyprus .4092 (9.48)  -.0814 (1.82)  .3925 (8.29) -.1618 (3.46)  
UK   .1666 (5.18) -.1023 (3.03)  .0105 (0.30)  .0146 (0.43)  
West Germany  .1497 (4.52)  .1464 (4.29) -.1920 (5.37) -.0110 (0.32)  
Constant  -2.5138 -1.9696   -3.0345-1.8884   
N 25,642  25,468  25,327 26,070 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2.0685 .0552 .0503 .0798 
 
Source: Eurobarometer #73.4, May 2010 
Notes: excluded categories, employed; Belgium; Age Left School (ALS) <16; age 35-44; 
Politics - left and origin 'in our country'. Asia and Africa also includes Latin America 
USA/Japan means North America and also includes Oceania. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Questions. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally 
disagree (=1), tend to disagree (=2), tend to agree (=3) or totally agree (=4)? 
Column 1. Globalization is an opportunity for economic growth? 
Column 2. Globalization increases social inequalities? 
Column 3. Globalization protects us from price increases? 
Column 4. Globalization is profitable only for large companies, not for citizens? 
 
